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ABSTRACT
All organisations, whether in the public or private sector, use computers for the
storage and processing of information relating to their business or services,
their employees and their customers. A large proportion of families and
individuals in their homes now also use personal computers and, both
intentionally and inadvertently, often store on those computers personal
information. It is clear that most organisations and individuals continue to be
unaware of the information that may be stored on the hard disks that the
computers contain, and have not considered what may happen to the
information after the disposal of the equipment.
In 2005, joint research was carried out by the University of Glamorgan in
Wales and Edith Cowan University in Australia to determine whether second
hand computer disks that were purchased from a number of sources still
contained any information or whether the information had been effectively
erased. The research revealed that, for the majority of the disks that were
examined, the information had not been effectively removed and as a result,
both organisations and individuals were potentially exposed to a range of
potential crimes. It is worthy of note that in the disposal of this equipment, the
organisations involved had failed to meet their statutory, regulatory and legal
obligations.
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This paper describes a second research project that was carried out in 2006
which repeated the research carried out the previous year and also extended the
scope of the research to include additional countries. The methodology used
was the same as that in the previous year and the disks that were used for the
research were again supplied blind by a third party. The research involved the
forensic imaging of the disks which was followed by an analysis of the disks to
determine what information remained and whether it could be easily recovered
using publicly available tools and techniques.
Keywords: Computer forensics, disk analysis, data recovery, data disposal.
1. INTRODUCTION
In January 2005, a joint report (Jones, et al., 2005) was published by the
University of Glamorgan in Wales and Edith Cowan University in Australia
detailing the investigation of a number of second hand hard disks revealed that
a large number of the disks examined still contained significant volumes of
sensitive information. The research had been undertaken to gain an
understanding of the level and type of information that resided on disks that
had been offered for sale on the second hand market.
There was a limited amount of evidence from one report (Garfinkel and Shelat,
2003) and a number of commercially sponsored investigations and newspaper
reports that there was an ongoing problem with regard to residual data on
disks, however, before the 2005 report, there did not appear to have been any
significant prior research into the subject.
The report identified that the great majority of the disks that were examined did
still contain significant volumes of information that was considered to be
sensitive, whether they had originally been used by businesses or in the homes
of individuals.
This report contains the initial results of a much wider research project that was
again carried out by the University of Glamorgan in Wales and Edith Cowan
University in Australia.
This project was sponsored by British
Telecommunications (BT) and Life Cycle Services (LCS) and was undertaken
during 2006 in order to determine whether there had been any change in the
situation with regard to the level of information that remained on second hand
hard disks in the intervening period and also to gain an understanding of how
the results that were obtained compared the situation that was observed in
results that were obtained from a number of other countries.
The results for the two sets of research, which were both conducted under the
same conditions with tools that had similar capabilities, were then compared
and a number of conclusions and recommendations on ways in which the
situation could be improved were made.
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2. THE RESEARCH
In order to gain realistic results from the research, the number of disks that
were purchased in the UK and Australia were the same as or more than in the
previous year. Nearly two hundred disks were obtained from the UK and
approximately fifty in Australia. In addition, a scientifically sound sample of
disks (in the region of 30) was obtained from both North America and
Germany. All of the disks obtained were purchased at computer auctions,
computer fairs or through eBay in the respective geographic areas. The disks
were purchased discretely, either individually or in small batches, to minimise
the possibility of the sellers becoming aware of the end use of the disks.
As with the previous research, the disks were supplied ‘blind’ to the
researchers, with the only identifier on the disks being a sequential serial
number. That is to say the disks were supplied to the researchers with no
indication of where or how they had been obtained. The research was
undertaken replicating the earlier research methodology, with each disk being
forensically imaged and then placed into secure storage. All further research
was carried out on the image of the original disk. While this may not be
considered significant, it was thought to be an essential practice, as it allowed
all of the research to be carried out in a non intrusive manner that did not affect
or change the data that had been collected. This allowed the potential for other
investigations to take place in the event of information being discovered during
the course of the research that might indicate criminal activity or breaches of
security. In the 2006 research this was found to have been an essential
precautionary step, as two of the disks were found to contain material that
necessitated them being passed to the police for further investigation.
The tools used to carry out the disk analysis performed similar functions to the
Windows Unformat and Undelete commands and a hex editor (which can be
used to view any information that existed in the unallocated portion of the disk)
and the freely available tool Autopsy in the Linux based Helix Version 1.7
disk. These types of tool are available to anyone who could obtain the disks.
The first objective of the research was to determine whether there was any
information on the disk that was easily visible or recoverable with the tools
identified above. The second stage of the research was to look for specific
elements of information that would allow for the identification of the
organisation or individual that had used the disk and, if possible, further
information such as the usernames, email addresses or documents, spreadsheets
and databases. The purpose of this phase of the research was to determine the
proportion of the disks that could be traced to an organisation or an individual.
The research is currently on-going; however, the initial results indicate that in
both the UK and Australia little has changed in the level of information that
remains on disks that have been released by organisations.
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3. SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM 2005 RESEARCH
In summary, the 2005 research reported that, of the ninety-two disks that were
obtained in the UK that could be accessed, the following were revealed:
• 17 percent of the disks were totally blank and contained no file
structure or data. Information that was made available after the
analysis revealed that of these, 12 of the 16 disks that contained no
data had been seeded by the recycling company (Life Cycle
Services) that had sponsored the purchase of the disks for the
research, to test its own procedures. This meant that only 4 (4%)
of the 92 disks that were obtained on the second hand market were
totally blank.
• In 48 percent of the disks that were examined, some attempt had
been made to remove data. These efforts ranged from the simple
deletion of files, to a formatting of the disk, to a fresh installation
of an operating system over the existing operating system.
• 57 percent of the disks examined contained sufficient information
to enable the organisation from which they had originated to be
identified.
• 51 percent of the disks contained details from which individuals
could be identified.
• 20 percent of the disks contained financial information relating to
the organisations, including staff salary details, sales receipts and
profit and loss reports.
• 8 percent of the disks contained details of the network
infrastructure of the organisations from which they had originated,
including server names, proxy numbers and other IP numbers.
• 4 percent of the disks contained potentially illicit (pornographic)
data. In the form of either illicit photographs or references to sites
that appeared to contain illicit material.
The results of research conducted in Australia in 2004 and 2005 (Valli 2004;
Jenkins 2005) showed a situation very similar to that which was revealed by
the research in the UK. Of the 23 disks examined in the Australian research,
information on 21 of the disks was easily recoverable, one hard disk had been
erased and one hard disk had mechanical failure. It became apparent that some
of the disks had come from systems belonging to critical infrastructure
providers in the form of power generation, water and telecommunications
utilities; a particular concern as the files systems were intact and required a
simple power on in compatible hardware.
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4. RESULTS OF 2006 RESEARCH
The 2006 research was undertaken to determine whether the situation had
changed in the intervening period and whether organisations and individuals
had taken steps to address the issues that were revealed during the earlier
report.
The initial 2006 research has revealed that, while there have been some
changes, the results, as in the previous research, show that a significant number
of disks still contain information that could be considered sensitive. This would
appear to highlight two separate points. The first is that the situation with
regard to the disposal of hard disks in the countries that had not been
previously been surveyed is producing results that are very similar to those that
have been observed in the UK and Australia. The second is that, despite an
increasing awareness as a result of publicity from a number of information
losses and incidents of identity theft and the results of a number of surveys
(Synovate 2003; Price Waterhouse 2006; Johannes 2006) and increasing level
of regulation, organisations are not modifying their procedures to ensure that
information is effectively removed before the disposal of the computer
hardware.
The initial results from the disks analysed to date in the 2006 research have
revealed a small increase in the number of disks that have been effectively
wiped, but that 44 percent of the disks have recoverable data in the slack space
and 24 percent of the disks still have file structures present from which the data
could be easily recovered.
Detailed below are the initial results of the 2006 research, reported by country.
For the disks analysed in the UK:
• Of 200 disks obtained, 82 (41%) were unreadable and failed to
spin up.
• 37 (31% of the readable disks) were totally blank and no data
could be recovered from them.
• 25 (21% of the readable disks) contained sufficient information for
the organisation that they had come from to be identified.
• 24 (20% of the readable disks) contained sufficient information for
individuals to be identified.
• 18 (15% of the readable disks) contained information on personnel
and of a personal nature.
• 12 (10% of the readable disks) contained financial information on
the organisation or individual from which they had originated,
including:
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• An Automotive Company
• A Child Day care centre
• Local Government
• A Financial services organisation
• A retail store
• 1 (1% of the readable disks) contained information of a paedophile
nature and has been reported to the police.
• 12 (10% of the readable disks) contained information that might be
considered as illicit.
For the 24 disks that were obtained from North America:
• 12 (50% of the disks) were physically damaged and could not be
accessed
• 1 (8% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no data.
• Of the remaining 11 readable disks,
• 5 (42% of the readable disks)had come from commercial
organisations and
• 6 (50% of the readable disks) appeared to be from individuals.
• 3 (25% of the readable disks) contained illicit material.
For the 40 disks that were obtained from Germany:


29 (72% of the disks) were not in working order and could not be
accessed.



5 (45% of the readable disks) had been wiped and contained no
data.



Of the remaining 6 (55% of the readable disks), 2 had come from
commercial organisations and 2 appeared to be from individuals.
The source of the other 2 disks has not yet been determined.

For the 53 disks that were obtained from Australia:
• 3 (6%) of the disks were physically damaged and could not be
accessed
• 18 (36% of the disks) had been wiped and contained no data.
• Of the remaining 32 (60%),
• 14 (43%) could be identified as having come from commercial
organisations and
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• 9 (28%) appeared to be from individuals.
• 2 (6%)of the disks contained illicit material
The table below shows a comparison of the results of the 2005 and the 2006
disk surveys.
2005
2006
Total Number of Disks UK and Australia
116
253
Faulty/Unreadable
13 (13 %)
90 (36 %)
Wiped
17 (16 %1)
73 (45 %1)
Commercial Data Present
60 (70 %2)
42 (47 %2)
2
Individual data present
51 (59 % )
44 (49 %2)
1
Percentages are of the readable disks
2
Percentage of readable disks that had not been wiped
Table 1: Comparison of results of all of the disks in the 2005 and 2006 surveys
These raw results appear to indicate that there has been a significant change
between the results obtained during 2005 and 2006, with a significant increase
in the proportion of disks that were faulty and also a increase in the number of
disks that had been wiped effectively. This has had the effect of reducing the
proportion of disks that contain either commercial or individual data. Table 2
shows a comparison of the results from the disks obtained in the different
regions.
UK

Australia

Germany

North
America
24

Total Number of Disks
200
53
40
Analysed
Faulty/Unreadable
87 (43%)
3 (6%)
30 (75%)
12 (50%)
Wiped
55 (49%1) 18 (36%1)
4 (40%1)
1 (8%1)
2
2
2
Commercial data present 28 (35% ) 14 (44% )
4 (66% )
6 (50 %2)
2
2
2
Individual data present
35 (44% )
9 (28% )
3 (50% )
7 (58 %2)
1
Percentages are of the readable disks
2
Percentage of readable disks that had not been wiped
Table 2: A comparison of the results from the disks obtained in the different regions
The results from the individual countries reveal what appear to be two
significant disparities. The first is that the number of disks that were
unreadable varied from 6 percent in Australia to 75 percent in Germany. The
number of disks that were obtained in these two countries was not significantly
different and there is no obvious reason for the large difference in findings.
The second is that in the UK in 2006, the percentage of disks that had been
wiped had increased to 49 percent from 16 percent in 2005, but the first results
from the USA in 2006, with only 8 percent of the disks wiped are significantly
different.
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These are the first two sets of results from the UK and Australia that are
available and the first from the USA and Germany and because of this, they
may not be fully representative of the overall situation. It will be necessary to
monitor the situation over a period of at least three more years to determine
whether there are any significant patterns developing.
The type of material that was recovered from the disks that originated in
commercial and academic establishments included:
From a major automotive company, there was payroll information, internal
telephone contact details including mobile phone numbers, details of the
internal network configuration and copies of invoices and orders. In
addition there were also emails between the company and its customers,
meeting minutes and communications that were intended as written
warnings to staff relating to poor performance.
From a North American ship building company, there was information on
the names of some employees, photos of employees, photos of the
company site, and of ships (including the name of one vessel) and
company emails, referring to ship re-fits and visiting guests. The
recovered information also included details of the visit of a senior Local
Government official and his wife regarding the re-dedication of a Merchant
Ship and recovered emails included bids for contracts for Naval work
which required TOP SECRET security clearances to work on the contract.
There was also personal information recovered that would have been
embarrassing for the individual to which it referred and a quantity of
pornographic material that may have created the potential for blackmail.
From a British construction company, the information that was recovered
contained internal memos, user names and telephone numbers. Emails
were present and some personal information such as a Curriculum Vitae
(résumé). In addition, information was recovered on the network
infrastructure which contained some IP addresses and network information
referring to the company data centre.
Data from a disk recovered from an academic institute, a community
college, included the names and web surfing habits of the users, the names
of teachers, some confidential emails and possible information from the
school SIMS system. There was also data that is thought to be test scores
for individual children that was held in a database.
Data from a disk that appears to have originated in a local government
housing office made it possible to identify the main user, and contained
information on complaints relating to the housing office, lists of repairs,
contacts, lists of information for different sections of the council in
addition to email. It also included personal information for the main user
including a Curriculum Vitae, a wedding invitation, and a surprise birthday
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party for the user’s partner.
The type of material that was recovered from the disks that originated in
commercial and academic establishments included:
Illicit information including downloaded audio and video files. A number
of cases of pornographic material were encountered and also one case of
paedophile material (this has been referred to the police for further
investigation). There were also cases of family financial details including
bank accounts and credit cards, details of personal habits and email and
ICQ discussions. Additionally, there were also details of family names,
addresses and photos, details of a family’s holiday itinerary and
information on a music festival. In one case there was evidence that one of
the users had subscribed to online newsgroups such as
alt.binaries.erotica.teen.female.newsgroups.
In another case there were details of a family (a mother, father and 2
daughters) that ran a restaurant. The information recovered included menus
for the restaurant and staff names. The information recovered also included
the daughters’ school work and numerous photos of friends and
boyfriends (?) and a number of emails relating to a Canadian holiday and
the visit of the Canadian friends to the UK.
The disposal of disks that have not been wiped effectively and that may still
contain significant information is not a new issue. As early as 1993, an article
in the Canadian Globe and Mail (Canadian Globe and Mail 1993) reported that
a second hand hard disk that had been sold to an Edmonton man that contained
confidential personnel files on 166 employees of an Alberta organisation. A
paper presented at a 1996 conference (Gutmann 1996) discussed the subject of
the secure deletion of data. A report (Cullen 2000) appeared in ‘The Register’,
regarding the disposal by the Morgan Grenfell Asset Management merchant
bank of a disk that contained details of Sir Paul McCartney’s bank account. A
second paper by (Gutmann 2001) examined Data Remanence in
Semiconductor Devices and then another paper (Garfinkel and Shelat 2003)
examined ways in which disks could be ‘sanitized’. In 2004, an article
(Leyden 2004) published in the Register reported that a mobile security group
called Pointsec Mobile Technologies had purchased a hard disk for £5 through
eBay that contained a customer database and the current access codes to what
was supposed to be a secure Intranet of a large European financial services
group. Finally in 2005, there were a number of reports including:
One in May (TechWeb News 2005) indicating that 70% of second hand
hard disks still contained data and one in September (BBC News), which
reported the information found by Disklabs on 100 disks that they had
obtained.
Given the level of exposure that the subject has received over a considerable
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period, the availability of suitable tools1 to ensure the safe disposal of
information, increasing legislative pressure and the increasing literacy of
computer users over the period, there is now little excuse in the public and
business sectors for ensuring that disks are effectively cleaned before disposal.
In the case of disks that have come from the home environment it is, perhaps,
easier to understand as home users will not necessarily have the knowledge or
tools available to clean a disk before disposal. On the other hand, with the
increasing publicity with regard to identity theft and fraud, it would seem to be
reasonable to expect that they would be very cautious and take significant steps
to ensure that their personal information was removed before they disposed of
the disks.
The implications of these failures to adequately remove the data are that, as a
result of a breakdown in their corporate or individual security or inadequate
management of the procedures for the disposal of equipment, information
continues to be available to people who may seek to exploit it.
5. CONCLUSIONS
While there has clearly been an improvement since the previous research in
2005 in the proportion of disks that have been effectively wiped (up from 17%
in 2005 to 31% in 2006 in the UK and up from 4% in 2005 (1 in 23) to 36% in
2006 in Australia) this still represents less than half of the disks that could be
read. The increased number of disks that had been effectively wiped has
reduced the proportion of the disks that contain sensitive organisational or
personal information, but this type of information was still found on more than
one in four of the disks that could be accessed.
Perhaps the most significant change was in the proportion of disks that were
purchased that could not be accessed, with a huge 36 percent of the disks being
faulty. Whilst it is accepted that the purchase of second hand disks is normally on
an ‘as seen’ basis, this high a level of faulty disks seems inordinately high and
cannot be attributed to damage in transit or any other single cause. It was notable
that the overwhelming majority of the disks obtained in Germany were faulty.
There remains a clear requirement for the education and training of the relevant
staff within organisations and of home users to inform them of the potential
problems that arise from the failure to properly remove the information from
disks and systems that are leaving their control and to make them aware of the
potential costs to their organisations and the individuals of this failure. When
organisations dispose of surplus and obsolete computers and hard disks, they
must ensure that, whether they are handled by internal resources or through a
third party contractor, adequate procedures are in place to destroy any data and
also to check that the procedures that are in place are effective.
1

Such as the Blancco tool which is approved for use by the UK Government.
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS
The type of measures that organisations and individuals could be taken to
reduce the volume of information that is inadvertently released when
equipment is disposed of includes:
1. A general public awareness campaign and the wide publication of
information on the risks of data leakage and measures that can be
taken to prevent it. This could be carried out by the Government,
the media, industry or academia.
2. Organisations should carry out a risk assessment to determine the
level of assurance that is required that all information has been
removed from the disks.
3. Organisations should introduce procedures to ensure that computer
systems and computer hard disks that are disposed of are properly
cleaned and that all data is erased to an appropriate standard. This
could include steps such as a process to validate the effectiveness
of internal data removal procedures to an identified standard or
checks to ensure that any third party contractor has cleaned the
disks to an adequate standard.
4. An alternative step that organisations could be introduced is the
physical destruction of the disks.
5. The information and communications technology industry could
make available the tools and facilities to enable individuals to
effectively remove the information from their computers before
they are recycled.
6. Individuals and organisations should consider the full encryption
of hard disks so that if the disk is lost or the data is not effectively
removed, it will not be easily recoverable. This would provide
adequate protection in most situations.
7. CONTRIBUTING ORGANISATIONS
British Telecommunications (BT). BT is one of the world's leading providers of
communications solutions serving customers in Europe, the Americas and Asia
Pacific. Its principal activities include networked IT services, local, national and
international telecommunications services, and higher-value broadband and
internet products and services. In the UK, BT serves more than 20 million
business and residential customers with more than 30 million exchange lines, as
well as providing network services to other licensed operators.
Life Cycle Services (LCS). LCS is the UK’s leading specialists in the asset
refurbishment, redeployment and secure disposal of information and
communication technology.
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Edith Cowan University (ECU). The Security and Intelligence research cluster
of the School of Computing and Information Science at ECU conducts research
into all aspects of Information Operations from the technological aspects of
computers and network security to the ‘softer’ side involving issues such as
perception management and information policy. At present, its research theme
is ‘deception’. The group has numerous doctoral, masters and honours
candidates.
Its main areas of interest are information operations,
computer/network forensics, RFID security, mobile computing security,
honeypots and the use of deception in security.
University of Glamorgan (UoG). The Information Security Research Unit in
the School of Computing at the UoG has a strong and well established theme in
the areas of Network Security, computer forensics and the threats to
information systems. The Unit is focused on the issues associated with the
design and development of early warning systems that are capable of detecting
and responding to a variety of cyber based attacks, and on the issues associated
with computer forensic science. In particular, they are developing technologies
such as secure XML, threat assessment methods, vulnerability management,
IDS data integration, data mining, data fusion and secure wireless mobile
computing. The unit has two specialised laboratories, the Network Security
Laboratory and the Computer Forensics Laboratory.
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